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FIFTH AMENDMENT-ADMISSIBILITY
OF CONFESSION OBTAINED
WITHOUT MIRANDA WARNINGS IN
NONCUSTODIAL SETTING
Minnesota v. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth amendment right to remain silent guarantees that a
state may not compel individuals to incriminate themselves in a
criminal matter.' To ensure that suspects are not coerced into waiv-
ing this constitutional right, the Supreme Court held in Miranda v.
Arizona 2 that in inherently coercive situations, the state must warn
individuals of their rights.3 In Minnesota v. Murphy,4 the Supreme
Court held that a person who is required to tell the truth to his pro-
bation officer, and thereby incriminates himself in an unrelated
criminal matter, is not afforded fifth amendment warnings. 5 In Mur-
phy, the Court limited the scope of an individual's fifth amendment
right to be free from compelled self-incrimination and created an
avenue by which states may obtain involuntary confessions "by taking
advantage of suspects' lack of knowledge of their constitutional
rights.
6
This Note argues that the Murphy Court correctly refused to
apply the Miranda warning requirement because Murphy's situation
was not as inherently coercive as interrogation in police custody. 7
The Court, however, ignored factors that undermined Murphy's
free choice to exercise his right to remain silent.8 The Court, there-
fore, unjustifiably determined that Murphy could not claim the privi-
lege at trial to prevent admission of his incriminating statements.9
1 U.S. CONST. amend. V states: "No person shall. . . be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself."
2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3 Id.
4 104 S. Ct. 1136 (1984).
5 Id. at 1149.
6 See infra notes 135-44 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 110-20 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.




The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination af-
fords individuals the right to remain silent when confronted with
questions that might incriminate them in a criminal matter. 10 Under
an adversarial criminal justice system, the government may not use
its power to coerce self-incriminating testimony from a suspect, but
must seek incriminating evidence through independent means.11
The government, therefore, may not exert pressure upon individu-
als to forego their fifth amendment privilege by threatening them
with physical punishment, criminal sanctions, or any other substan-
tial penalty.
In most situations, suspects are responsible for claiming the
privilege on their own initiative. Their failure to do so results in
their losing the benefit of the privilege. 12 In some situations, how-
ever, the courts have granted suspects a self-executing privilege.
Suspects may assert the privilege at trial to suppress incriminating
statements even though the suspect failed to invoke the privilege at
the time of interrogation. The purpose of this self-executing privi-
lege is to overcome possible restraints on a suspect's free will that
may result from inherently coercive situations. The assertion of the
fifth amendment privilege has arisen in widely varying contexts in-
cluding custodial interrogations,1 3 cross-examination of subpoe-
naed witnesses, 14 and interrogations in which the government has
threatened suspects for invoking the privilege. 15 Although each sit-
uation involves self-incrimination, the constitutional protection af-
forded to the accused differs in each situation.
A. THE CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION CASES
One situation in which the Court has recognized a self-execut-
ing privilege is interrogation of a suspect in police custody. Because
of the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation, 16 the
10 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
11 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581-82 (1961); see also Garner v. United
States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (the "fundamental purpose" of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination is "the preservation of an adversary system of crimi-
nal justice").
12 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1143.
13 See infra notes 16-34 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
16 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-46 n.5. In Miranda, the Court documented the use of
physical force and psychological coercion to elicit incriminating information. As an ex-
ample, the Court mentioned a case in which "police brutally beat, kicked and placed
lighted cigarette butts on the back of a potential witness under interrogation for the
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Court has recognized an exception to the non-self-executing nature
of the fifth amendment privilege. 17 The simple fact that a suspect is
surrounded by police in an unfamiliar, hostile environment may un-
dermine the suspect's free will and prompt self-incriminating state-
ments where the suspect otherwise would have remained silent.' 8
The traditional test for determining the admissibility of self-in-
criminating statements made in police custody focused on the vol-
untariness of the confession.' 9 Under this test, the reviewing court
subjectively scrutinized the trial court record to determine whether
the confession was the product of the accused's free will or whether
the confession was coerced by government authorities. 20 If the
court found that coercive police conduct overcame the suspect's
free will, the court would render the statement inadmissible to pro-
tect the suspect's fourteenth amendment due process rights. 21
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court abandoned the focus
on surrounding circumstances and developed a per se test for the
admissibility of confessions. 22 The Court held that "when an indi-
vidual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by
the authorities in any significant way," 23 he must be warned of his
constitutional rights before interrogation.24 This per se test created
purpose of securing a statement." Id. at 446 (citing People v. Portelli, 15 N.Y.2d 235,
205 N.E.2d 857, 257 N.Y.S.2d 931 (1965)).
17 Id. at 445-48, 479-91.
18 Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602. The Court noted that many factors involved in custodial
interrogation may undermine a suspect's free choice to remain silent: extensive cross-
questioning, refusal to permit communication with friends or legal counsel, "the dura-
tion and conditions of detention,. . . the manifest attitude of the police toward him,
[and] his physical and mental state." Id.
19 For a discussion of the historical trend of admissibility of confessions, see Note,
Fifth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Assertion & Subsequent Waiver of the Right to Counsel,
74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1315, 1316 (1983). See also Kamisar, A Dissent from the
Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment & the Old "Voluntariness"
Test, 65 MicH. L. REV. 59 (1966); Note, Constitutional Law - Supreme Court Limits the Appli-
cation of Miranda by Narrowing the Definition of "Custodial Interrogation", 45 FoRDHAM L.
REV. 1222 (1977).
20 Culombe, 367 U.S. at 602.
21 Id. Also, in Miranda, the Court noted that even after the publication of a report by
a congressional committee that documented the use of coercion to obtain confessions,
"the police resorted to physical brutality-beating, hanging, whipping-and to sus-
tained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order to extort a confession." 384
U.S. at 445-46.
22 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
23 Id. at 478.
24 Id. The Court held that the warnings must inform the accused that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him if he so desires.
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an "exception to the general rule that the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege is not self-executing 25 by allowing accused persons to claim
the benefit of the privilege at trial even though they failed to claim
the privilege during interrogation. The Court thus sought to pro-
tect individuals against "the overbearing compulsion. . . caused by
isolation of a suspect in police custody." 26
The reach of the Miranda procedural safeguards was limited
subsequently by decisions that narrowly interpreted the definition of
"custodial interrogation." 27 In Beckwith v. United States,28 two Inter-
nal Revenue Service agents questioned a suspect in a private home
while investigating a possible criminal federal income tax violation.
The agents informed the suspect of the purpose of the interrogation
and told him that he was not required to answer any incriminating
questions. 29 The Court held that this interrogation did not fall
within the definition of "custody" according to Miranda even
though the purpose of the interrogation was to incriminate the sus-
pect.30 By refusing to extend the definition of "custodial interroga-
tion" in Miranda to a situation in which the suspect had not been
placed under arrest, Beckwith set the stage for subsequent decisions
that would ignore the language of Miranda that required a self-exe-
cuting privilege whenever the suspect was "deprived of his freedom
by the authorities in any significant way." 31
In Oregon v. Mathiason,32 a suspect voluntarily met with a police
officer at a patrol station and confessed to a burglary. The Court
25 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1146.
26 United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 n.5 (1977).
27 See Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969); Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968). The Court has ruled that interrogation is custodial where there was no actual
arrest but there was a significant restriction on the suspect's freedom of movement. In
Mathis, the Court held that a jailhouse setting fell within the custody definition of Mi-
randa and required the use of warnings against self-incrimination. 391 U.S. at 5. Also,
in Orozco, the Court held that police interrogation at 4 a.m. in the suspect's bedroom was
"custodial." 394 U.S. at 326.
28 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
29 Id. at 343. The warnings given to the suspect failed to satisfy the Miranda warning
requirement because they did not specifically advise the suspect of the right to remain
silent and implied that the suspect could be compelled to answer non-incriminating
questions. The warnings also did not inform the suspect of his right to have appointed
counsel if he could not afford a lawyer. For a more detailed discussion of Beckwith, see
Note, Income Tax Investigations-Miranda Warnings Not Required Prior to Non-Custodial Inter-
view with IRS Agents, 81 DICK. L. REv. 368 (1977).
30 The defendant acknowledged that he understood his rights, and he testified that
he was not forced to answer any questions. Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 343; see Note, supra note
29, at 369 n.13.
31 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
32 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
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held admissible the suspect's confession.33 Thus, according to
Mathiason and Beckwith, custody is limited to situations in which the
suspect has been placed under arrest or his freedom of movement
has been seriously restricted.3
4
B. THE WITNESS CASES
Miranda created a per se rule barring admission of incriminat-
ing statements made by suspects who received no fifth amendment
warnings while being interrogated in police custody.
3
In Miranda, the Court refused to apply the voluntariness test
because of the presumption that custodial interrogation is inher-
ently coercive.3 6 Although the language of Miranda left open the
possibility that its per se rule would be applied in other situations
that were found to be inherently coercive,3 7 Beckwith subsequently
limited the scope of this per se rule to official arrest situations.38
Issues concerning the assertion of a self-executing fifth amend-
ment privilege also have arisen where the government subpoenaes
witnesses to testify at trial or before a grand jury. The Supreme
Court has never explicitly held that the compulsion inherent in
either situation requires the government to give Miranda-type warn-
ings despite the government's ability to compel testimony.3 9 In
United States v. Kordel,40 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
simultaneously maintained civil and criminal actions against the de-
fendant, a corporate officer. In his answers to FDA interrogatories
in the civil action, the defendant gave information that incriminated
him in the criminal action.4' He then asserted his fifth amendment
privilege in the criminal proceeding to prevent the admission of his
statements. The defendant claimed that in answering the interroga-
tories, he faced three unpleasant alternatives: forfeiting his corpora-
tion's property by refusing to answer, subjecting himself to the risk
of prosecution for perjury by lying, or aiding the government in
33 The defendant confessed within five minutes of entering the police station and was
free to leave at the end of the interrogation. Id. at 493-94.
34 Id. at 494; Beckwith, 425 U.S. at 344; see Note, Constitutional Law-Supreme Court Lim-
its Applicability of Miranda by Narrowing Definition of "Custodial Interrogation ", 45 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1222 (1977); Note, "In Custody?": A Relaxation of Miranda, 23 Loy. L. REV. 1057
(1977); Note, Criminal Procedure-Defining "Custodial Interrogation "for Purposes of Miranda:
Oregon v. Mathiason, 57 OR. L. REV. 184 (1977).
35 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
36 Id. at 457-58.
37 Id. at 444.
38 425 U.S. at 344.
39 See infra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
40 397 U.S. 1 (1970).
41 Id. at 7.
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convicting him in the criminal action by supplying helpful evidence
and leads.42 The Court held that Kordel's statements were admissi-
ble because the situation did not compel him to testify and that
"[w]ithout question he could have invoked his Fifth Amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. ' 43 The Court rec-
ognized, however, that Kordel was represented by counsel and
probably understood the consequences of answering the interroga-
tories without warnings from the government.
44
The Supreme Court has never decided explicitly whether the
government must give fifth amendment warnings to grand jury tar-
get witnesses45 before it may use their self-incriminating statements
to prosecute them for a target offense.46 In United States v.
Mandujano,47 a grand jury subpoenaed Mandujano to testify about
local drug trafficking. The prosecutor failed to administer full Mi-
randa warnings. The witness perjured himself and was subsequently
tried for perjury, but not for the drug-related crimes. The Court
held that the defendant could not invoke his privilege against self-
incrimination at the perjury trial to suppress his perjurious state-
ments.48 Because the defendant in Mandujano had been given some
warning and was prosecuted for perjury, this ruling left unresolved
whether the government must administer constitutional warnings to
use testimony to prosecute an individual for the target offense. 49
In United States v. Washington,50 the respondent, who was sus-
pected of involvement in a theft, was subpoenaed to appear before a
grand jury investigating the crime. The prosecutor gave the suspect
full Miranda warnings but did not inform him of his target status.
The Court held that the defendant's grand jury testimony could be
used against him at the subsequent trial for the target offense. 5'
Although the Court did not rule that Miranda warnings were re-
quired, it noted that in this situation, "the comprehensive warnings
respondent received . . . plainly satisfied any possible claim to
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 9-10.
45 For purposes of this discussion, "target witness" refers to a witness the govern-
ment is seeking to indict.
46 For a more detailed analysis of the constitutional rights available to grand jury
target witnesses, see Comment, Federal Grand Juries: The Plight of the Target Witness, 11
U.S.F.L. REv. 672 (1977).
47 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (plurality opinion).
48 Id. at 574-75.
49 Id.
50 431 U.S. 181 (1976).
51 Id. at 186-90.
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warnings" 52 and that his signing of a waiver-of-rights form was not
involuntary.53 The Court held that when witnesses supply incrimi-
nating information, they do not have a self-executing privilege that
can be invoked to prevent admission of the incriminating state-
ments. In each of the above cases, however, the defendants either
had the benefits of legal counsel or warnings that would have
alerted them to the consequences of supplying incriminating
information.
C. THE PENALTY CASES
The Court has held that a self-executing privilege exists where
the government threatens suspects with a substantial penalty for in-
voking their fifth amendment privilege.54 The suspect may assert
the self-executing privilege at trial to suppress any self-incriminat-
ing statement made under threat of penalty. In Garrity v. New
Jersey,55 the State threatened police officers who were under investi-
gation for corruption with discharge from their jobs if they claimed
their fifth amendment privilege.56 In response to the threat, an of-
ficer failed to invoke the privilege and incriminated himself.57 The
Court held that the situation gave rise to a self-executing privilege
that the individual could invoke at trial to suppress the incriminating
statements.58
The Court also has held that a self-executing privilege exists for
gamblers filing federal occupational and excise tax returns. 59 In
52 Id. at 186.
53 Id. at 186 n.4.
54 Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); see also Leflcowitz v. Cunningham, 431
U.S. 801 (1977) (state attempt to punish assertion of the fifth amendment privilege was
constitutionally impermissible); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (state may not
compel a contractor to waive his privilege against self-incrimination by threatening loss
of state contracts); Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation of New
York, 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (state may not threaten public employees with discharge for
refusal to waive privilege); Garner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (state may not
dismiss police officer solely for refusal to waive immunity).
55 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
56 Id. at 494.
57 Id. at 495.
58 Id. at 500.
59 See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). In Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62 (1968), the Court held that the government may not punish gamblers for refusal
to pay excise taxes on wagering or occupational taxes on gambling. The Court reasoned
that requiring the petitioners to pay these taxes, which were directed solely at gamblers,
would require them to incriminate themselves as gamblers. To force the petitioners to
choose between paying the taxes and facing prosecution for failure to do so, therefore,
would require them to choose between self-incrimination and a substantial penalty. See
also Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971).
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Marchetti v. United States, 60 the Court recognized that requiring gam-
blers to assert the privilege at the time the tax returns were due
would incriminate them. Thus, the Court held that the fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination allowed the gamblers to re-
frain from filing the occupational and excise tax returns. In
addition, the gamblers could assert the fifth amendment privilege as
a defense in a subsequent prosecution for failure to comply with
Internal Revenue Service filing regulations. 61 Under Garrity and
Marchetti, accused persons may fail to claim their privilege against
self-incrimination at the time the government requests information.
Accused persons then may exclude incriminating statements from
evidence at trial if the government threatens them with a substantial
penalty for refusing to provide the requested information. This is
true whether the penalty is an explicit threat of discharge from em-
ployment or whether the penalty involves the possibility of prosecu-
tion for gambling offenses or failure to file a tax return.
III. FACTS OF MINNESOTA V. MURPHY
In 1974, during their investigation of a rape and murder of a
teenage girl, Minneapolis police questioned Marshall Murphy but
failed to charge him with the crimes. 62 Six years later, Murphy was
charged with criminal sexual conduct in an unrelated case but
pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of false imprisonment. 63 Murphy
received a suspended sentence of sixteen months for the false im-
prisonment charge and was placed on three years probation. 64 Mur-
phy's probation requirements included participating in a treatment
program for sexual offenders, reporting to his probation officer as
60 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
61 Id. at 50-51. But see Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976), which held that
the defendant, a gambler, must file a federal income tax return even if the return might
incriminate him. Id. at 654. The Garner Court distinguished Marchetti and Grosso because
the occupational and excise taxes were directed solely at gamblers, "the great majority
of whom were likely to incriminate themselves by responding." Id. at 660. The Court,
however, pointed out that income tax returns contain only facially neutral questions
directed at the public at large and "the great majority of persons who file income tax
returns do not incriminate themselves by disclosing their occupation." Id. at 661. The
Court held, nevertheless, that the defendant could claim the privilege on the tax return.
If the IRS subsequently requested the omitted information, the taxpayer could refuse to
testify or supply the requested documents and rely on the privilege as a defense in a
prosecution for willful failure to supply information. See I.R.C. § 7203 (1985). The
Court also distinguished Garner from Garrity by stating that Garner would not be placed
in the same dilemma as the officer in Garrity because Garner could not be penalized for
claiming the privilege on his tax return. Garner, 424 U.S. at 661-63.
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she directed, and responding truthfully to her questions. 65 He also
had to sign a statement requiring him to comply with the conditions
of his probation.
66
From the time of his sentence until July 1981, Murphy met with
his probation officer approximately once a month.67 At this time, a
counselor from his treatment program told his probation officer that
Murphy had abandoned the program.68 The probation officer wrote
to Murphy, telling him that if he failed to arrange a meeting with
her, she would immediately request a warrant for his arrest.69 At
the following meeting, the officer agreed not to revoke Murphy's
probation because even though he had left the treatment program,
he "was employed and doing well in other areas."
70
In September 1981, a counselor in the treatment program told
Murphy's probation officer that while he was in treatment, Murphy
had confessed to a 1974 rape and murder.7' After meeting with her
superior, the probation officer decided that she would tell the police
what she had learned.72 In a letter to Murphy, she asked him to
meet with her "to discuss a treatment plan for the remainder of the
probationary period."
73
Murphy arranged a meeting with the probation officer in her
office on September 28, 1981. 74 At the meeting, the officer con-
fronted Murphy with what- the counselor had told her.75 Murphy
responded angrily to the counselor's breach of confidence and told
the officer that he "felt like calling a lawyer."'76 The officer told
65 Id.
66 Id. The probation letter that Murphy was required to sign read as follows:
For the present, you are only conditionally released. If you comply with the condi-
tions of your probation you may expect to be discharged at the expiration of the
period stated. If you fail to comply with the requirements you may be returned to
the Court at any time for further hearing or commitment....
It will be necessary for you to obey strictly the following conditions:
BE TRUTHFUL with your Probation Officer in all matters.
Id. at 1152-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).






73 Id. The Court assumed that Murphy's counselor could not have provided the in-
formation about Murphy to the police and that the probation officer could not have
provided the information to the state for use in a criminal prosecution because Murphy's
rehabilitation program was covered by federal statutes providing for the confidentiality
of patient records. Id. at 1140 n.1; see 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 4582 (1982).
74 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1140.
75 Id.
76 Id. The trial court found that this statement did not constitute "an invocation of
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Murphy he would have to postpone contacting a lawyer until after
the meeting and that "their primary concern was the relationship
between the crimes that Murphy had admitted to the Alpha House
counselor and the incident that led to his conviction for false
imprisonment."
'77
Murphy then confessed to the rape and murder, denied his guilt
on the false imprisonment charge, and tried to explain the extenuat-
ing circumstances surrounding the earlier crimes. 78 The officer told
Murphy she would inform the police and tried to persuade him to
surrender. 79 Two days later, Murphy told the officer that he had
been advised by counsel not to turn himself in.8 0 An arrest warrant
was issued, and Murphy was indicted for first degree murder on Oc-
tober 29, 1981.81
The trial court denied Murphy's motion to suppress his confes-
sion because it found that the confession was not compelled even
though Murphy had received no warnings against self-incrimina-
tion.82 The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Mur-
phy's failure to claim the privilege was not fatal to his motion to
suppress the statement at trial "[b]ecause of the compulsory nature
of the meeting, because [Murphy] was under court order to respond
truthfully to his agent's questions, and because the agent had sub-
stantial reason to believe that [Murphy's] answers'were likely to be
incriminating." 8 3 The court also held that the probation officer's
failure to inform Murphy of his privilege against self-incrimination
rendered his subsequent confession inadmissible. 84 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari 85 to determine whether "a
statement made by a probationer to his probation officer without
prior warnings is admissible in a subsequent criminal
proceeding."
86
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
Justice White's majority opinion held that Murphy's failure to
the privilege against self-incrimination," but indicated the defendant's desire to consult
an attorney in connection with a civil suit for breach of confidentiality. Id. at 1140 n.3.
77 Id. at 1140-41.





83 Id. (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 324 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn. 1982)).
84 Id. (citing Murphy, 324 N.W.2d at 344).
85 459 U.S. 1145 (1983).
86 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1141.
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claim the privilege against self-incrimination at the time of the ques-
tioning prevented him from asserting the privilege at trial.87 The
Court also held that the State had not compelled Murphy to forego
his fifth amendment privilege8 8 and that the circumstances under
which Murphy confessed fell outside the scope of the exceptions to
the general rule that the fifth amendment privilege is not self-
executing.
8 9
The Court ruled that the State had not compelled Murphy to
incriminate himself by requiring him to report to his probation of-
ficer and answer her questions truthfully.90 The Court found that
the terms of Murphy's probation placed him in "no better position
than the ordinary witness at trial, or before grand jury who is sub-
poenaed, sworn to tell the truth, and obligated to answer on the
pain of contempt, unless he invokes the privilege and shows that he
faces a realistic threat of self-incrimination." 9' Because Murphy
could have claimed his fifth amendment privilege without suffering a
penalty, the Court ruled that the State had not violated the fifth
amendment because it had not compelled him to make incriminat-
ing statements.
92
Examining the situations in which the fifth amendment privi-
lege has been held to be self-executing, the Court concluded that
the probation officer's interrogation was not "custodial," and Mur-
phy was not threatened with a penalty for exercising his privilege.
Murphy, therefore, could not invoke his privilege to bar admission
of his confession at trial. 93 The Court held Miranda inapplicable be-
cause Murphy was neither "in custody" nor was his freedom of
movement curtailed to the degree associated with formal arrest. 94
The Court also dismissed as unpersuasive four mitigating factors
87 Id. Justice White was joined by ChiefJustice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1143-46.
90 Id. at 1146-49; see supra note 66 for terms of Murphy's probation.
91 104 S. Ct. at 1142.
92 Id. The Court quoted United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1 (1970): "[defendant's]
failure at any time to assert the constitutional privilege leaves him in no position to
complain now that he was compelled to give testimony against himself." Id. at 1143
(quoting Kordel, 397 U.S. at 10). The Court also cited Garner, 424 U.S. at 654; Rogers v.
United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1951); and Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration,
273 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1927), to support the proposition that because the defendant
failed to assert the privilege at the time he was questioned, he could not assert the privi-
lege at trial.
93 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1143-46.
94 Id. at 1144. The Court also stated that custody for Miranda purposes has been
narrowly construed. Id. (citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977)). See
supra notes 18-34 and accompanying text.
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that the Minnesota Supreme Court held brought Murphy's confes-
sion within the Miranda rule.95
The majority also decided that Murphy's privilege was not self-
executing because the State had not "require[d] him to choose be-
tween making incriminating statements and jeopardizing his consti-
tutional liberty by remaining silent." 96 The Court reiterated that
Murphy was in the same position as a witness under oath and that
the terms of his probation required him to answer truthfully but did
not require him to answer incriminating questions.97 The Court
concluded that any belief that his probation could be revoked for
claiming the privilege was unreasonable and that Murphy should
have sought clarification of the terms of his probation if he was in
doubt. 98 The Court also distinguished Garrity99 because in that
case, the State had explicitly threatened the employees if they as-
serted the privilege.100 Finally, the Court decided that the self-exe-
cuting privilege that it granted to gamblers filing federal
occupational and excise tax returns did not apply to Murphy be-
cause, unlike the gamblers, Murphy would not necessarily incrimi-
nate himself by claiming the privilege. 10 1
In his dissent, Justice Marshall agreed that Murphy could have
invoked his fifth amendment privilege, but he found that under the
circumstances of the case, Murphy had not waived his privilege, and
the State had the burden of proving that Murphy knowingly and
freely waived his constitutional rights.' 0 2 Because the State
95 104 S. Ct. at 1144. The Court held that the state's power to "compel Murphy's
attendance and truthful answers" was indistinguishable from its power to compel wit-
nesses to testify and, therefore, not coercive enough to bring Murphy within the Miranda
exception. Id. The four mitigating factors that the Court dismissed as unpersuasive
were: "First, the probation officer could compel Murphy's attendance and truthful an-
swers. . . . Second, the probation officer consciously sought incriminating evi-
dence. . . .Third, Murphy did not expect questions about prior criminal conduct and
could not seek counsel before attending the meeting. . . .Fourth, there were no ob-
servers to guard against abuse or trickery." Id. at 1144-45.
96 Id. at 1147.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 1148.
99 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
100 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1146. The Court also cited Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431
U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973); and Uniformed Sanitation
Men Ass'n v. Comm'r of Sanitation of New York, 392 U.S. 280 (1968), as holding that a
self-executing privilege exists in penalty situations. In none of these cases did the de-
fendants succumb to the threats and fail to exercise the privilege at the time of interro-
gation. Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1146. These cases, however, hold that the state may not
penalize a suspect for refusal to answer an interrogator's questions where the suspect
has validly asserted his fifth amendment privilege.
101 104 S. Ct. at 1149. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
102 104 S. Ct. at 1150-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall was joined by
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presented Murphy with a constitutionally impermissible choice be-
tween self-incrimination and loss of his probation, Justice Marshall
would have ruled that Murphy's privilege was self-executing, and
that he therefore did not lose the benefit of the privilege by answer-
ing his probation officer's questions.10 3 Marshall pointed out that
the privilege against self-incrimination was self-executing except
when
at least two of the following statements have been true:
(a) At the time the damaging disclosures were made, the defendant's
constitutional right not to make them was clearly established.
(b) The defendant was given sufficient warning that he would be asked
potentially incriminating questions to be able to secure legal advice
and to reflect upon how he would respond.
(c) The environment in which questions were asked did not impair the
defendant's ability intelligently to exercise his rights.
(d) The questioner had no reason to assume that truthful responses
would be self-incriminating. 0 4
Finding none of the above conditions in the instant situation, Justice
Marshall emphasized the potential danger that probation officers
would abuse probationers' trust and obtain statements from sus-




The right to remain silent serves two purposes. First, it ensures
that a confession is reliable, 0 6 and second, it fosters an adversarial
rather than inquisitorial criminal justice system. 10 7 The accused
generally is required to claim the fifth amendment privilege by re-
fusing to answer incriminating questions. If accused persons answer
such questions, they will be barred from later asserting the privilege
to prevent admission of the statements at trial.' 08 In some situa-
tions, however, the right to claim the privilege may be unclear. Sus-
pects may not realize that they have a right to claim the privilege
and that they will lose this right if they do not assert it when they are
interrogated. Courts, therefore, should examine carefully situations
where suspects were not given warnings and subsequently incrimi-
Justice Stevens. Justice Brennan joined the dissenting opinion in all but Part 11-A, in
which Justice Marshall surveyed cases holding that "in most contexts, the privilege
against self-incrimination is not self-executing." Id. at 1152 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
103 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104 Id. at 1156 (Marshall,J, dissenting).
105 Id. at 1156-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106 Garner, 424 U.S. at 655.
107 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961).
108 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
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nated themselves. In Murphy, however, the Court failed to recog-
nize Murphy's lack of knowledge and unreasonably held him
responsible for invoking the privilege at the time of questioning.10 9
By ignoring factors that undermined Murphy's free will, the Court
also unnecessarily expanded the State's ability to coerce suspects to
waive their fifth amendment privilege by exploiting the suspects'
lack of knowledge of their constitutional rights.
A. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF THE MIRANDA CUSTODIAL EXCEPTION
The Court's refusal to extend the Miranda warning requirement
to the noncustodial setting of the probation officer's office is both
reasonable and consistent with precedent. Since Miranda was de-
cided in 1966, the trend has been toward limiting its application to
police arrest situations. 110 The rationale behind this limitation is
that where suspects are neither "in custody" nor in an inherently
coercive setting, it is unnecessary for police to warn them.111 The
setting in Murphy is easily distinguishable from police custody and is
not inherently coercive. As the Court correctly pointed out,
"[c]ustodial arrest is said to convey to the suspect a message that he
has no choice but to submit to the officers' will and to confess." 112
A pre-arranged meeting with a probation officer in a familiar setting
is unlikely to evoke the same response from the probationer. 1is
Most importantly, "the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation
derives in large measure from an interrogator's insinuations that the
interrogation will continue until a confession is obtained." 114 Mur-
phy, however, was not physically restrained and was free to leave the
meeting at any time. 115
The Court's refusal to extend the warning requirement to the
probation office setting is also consistent with Beckwith v. United
States.ll 6 In Beckwith, the Court refused to require Miranda warnings
when Internal Revenue Service agents interrogated a suspect in a
private home. Although the agents purposely sought incriminating
evidence during the interrogation, the Court reasoned that the
109 104 S. Ct. at 1149.
110 See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
111 Id.
112 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1145.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 1145-46.
115 Although Murphy may have feared revocation of his probation if he left without
answering the probation officer's questions, he was under no obligation to remain in her
office until the questions were answered. In custodial interrogation, however, uni-
formed officers usually detain suspects, using force when necessary.
116 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
[Vol. 75686
1984] CONFESSION IN NONCUSTODIAL SETTING
agents' intent alone did not justify the assumption that the setting
was so inherently coercive or that the danger of coercing the suspect
was so imminent as to require rigid procedural safeguards. 11 7 Simi-
larly, the probation officer in Murphy purposely sought incriminat-
ing evidence. 1 8 As in Beckwith, the intent of the officer, by itself,
does not require the conclusion that the officer coerced Murphy's
confession.
In Miranda, the Court created a per se rule allowing accused
persons who are interrogated while in police custody without bene-
fit of fifth amendment warnings to invoke the privilege at trial and
thereby prevent the State from using any incriminating statements
against them."19 Under this rule, courts do not decide whether a
statement was coerced or voluntary. Instead, the Miranda Court
held that interrogation under police custody was so inherently coer-
cive as to justify barring admission of any statement made in the
absence of a fifth amendment warning. 120 In Beckwith, the Court's
refusal to extend the warning requirement to situations in which the
suspect had not been arrested is consistent with Miranda because
noncustodial situations are not usually as compelling as arrest situa-
tions. Murphy's situation was neither as hostile nor as intimidating
as interrogation while in police custody. In Murphy, therefore, the
Court justifiably refused to extend the Miranda warning requirement
to the instant situation.
Although the Court correctly decided that this warning require-
ment did not apply to Murphy's situation, the majority's reliance on
witness cases to establish the non-self-executing nature of Murphy's
privilege omitted essential considerations that make Murphy's situa-
tion more coercive than the courtroom setting. Unlike the suspects
in the witness and custodial interrogation cases, Murphy had no op-
portunity to consult with counsel nor was he warned of his right to
remain silent; moreover, his right to assert his privilege was unclear
at the time of his interrogation. 121 In Kordel, the fifth amendment
right of the witness, a corporate officer who faced incriminating
himself in a criminal action, was apparent at the time of the interro-
gation. 122 Likewise, in Washington, the defendant's right to remain
silent was well established.
123
117 Id. at 344.
118 104 S. Ct. at 1140.
119 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
120 Id. at 457-58.
121 104 S. Ct. at 1158-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122 The Court stated: "[w]ithout question [the defendant] could have invoked his
Fifth Amendment privilege." Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 (1970).
123 431 U.S. 181 (1976).
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In contrast, Murphy's right to remain silent was uncertain at the
time of his meeting with his probation officer. In an amicus brief for
the United States, the Solicitor General argued that the "govern-
ment may constitutionally exert upon a probationer pressures to in-
criminate himself that it could not exert upon a citizen who had not
been convicted of a crime."' 24 Although the Court stated that any
attempt by the State to punish Murphy for asserting the privilege
would have been unconstitutional, it is obvious from the Solicitor
General's belief that the State could exert pressure upon him that
Murphy's rights were not clearly established when he met with his
probation officer. Because of the uncertainty over his constitutional
right, the Court should not charge Murphy with knowledge of it.
Murphy's lack of knowledge would hinder his free choice to refuse
to answer.
The witness cases that the Court cited also differ from Murphy
because the defendants in these cases had the opportunity to con-
sult with counsel before giving self-incriminating testimony. In Kor-
del, the Court recognized that the defendant was represented by
counsel when he answered interrogatories that the government sub-
sequently used against him and, therefore, he probably understood
the consequences of his answers. 1 2 5 In both Washington12 6 and
Mandujano,127 the defendants were informed that they would be al-
lowed to consult with an attorney outside the grand jury room. In
Washington, the defendant explicitly consented to answer incriminat-
ing questions before the grand jury and chose not to speak with an
attorney.' 28 Murphy, however, was never told that he had the right
to speak with an attorney before he answered his probation officer's
questions. 129
The suspects who incriminated themselves before grand juries
also were warned of the possibility that testimony would be used
against them and were informed of their right to remain silent.
130
Although the defendant in Washington incriminated himself by re-
sponding to questions about crimes in which he was involved, the
Court found that he was aware of his rights and that he gave incrimi-
nating testimony knowing of the possible consequences in a crimi-
124 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1159 n.23 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae at 8).
125 397 U.S. at 7-10.
126 431 U.S. at 184.
127 425 U.S. at 581.
128 431 U.S. at 183-84.
129 104 S. Ct. at 1159 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
130 Washington, 431 U.S. at 183-84; Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 581.
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nal prosecution.1 31 The Court held that "the comprehensive
warnings respondent received . . . plainly satisfied any possible
claim to warnings."' 32 Because Murphy received no warnings, his
dilemma plainly was more compelling than Washington's situation.
In Murphy, the United States Supreme Court also unreasonably
interpreted the penalty cases as requiring a threat intended by the
State. The Court recognized that imposing a penalty for a valid ex-
ercise of the fifth amendment privilege could impermissibly
"foreclos[e] a free choice to remain silent."' 1 3 The Court in Murphy
should have examined the legal effect of the revocation statute to
determine whether it implied a threat of probation revocation for
assertion of the fifth amendment privilege. Instead, the Court relied
heavily on the fact that "Murphy was not expressly informed during
the crucial meeting with his probation officer that an assertion of the
privilege would result in the imposition of a penalty."'
34
B. APPLICATION OF THE VOLUNTARINESS STANDARD TO MURPHY
Because of the inapplicability of the witness and penalty cases
to the facts of Murphy, the Court should have examined the sur-
rounding circumstances to determine whether the confession was a
product of Murphy's free will. 135 Under a voluntariness test, the
Court should have examined three factors: the suspect's knowledge
of his right to remain silent, his access to legal counsel, and his per-
ception of a threat of penalty for invoking the privilege.'
36
131 431 U.S. at 188.
132 Id. at 186.
133 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1146 (quoting Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. at 661).
134 Id. at 1148.
135 A voluntariness standard was applied to determine the admissibility of confessions
obtained during custodial interrogation prior to Miranda. See supra text accompanying
notes 19-21. Under this test, the Court focused on surrounding circumstances and char-
acteristics to determine whether a confession was a product of an accused's free will.
See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (Court ruled confession involuntary
and therefore inadmissible where police questioned suspect, an uneducated immigrant
with documented mental disorders, for prolonged period of time, used a childhood
friend to help break down his resistance, and denied him access to counsel).
136 A voluntariness test was also proposed for use in grand jury target witness cases.
See Comment, Federal GrandJuries: The Plight of the Target Witness, 11 U.S.F.L. REv. 672
(1977). Under this test, the court would determine whether a grand jury target witness'
testimony could be used in a subsequent prosecution for the target offense by examining
four factors. First, the court must decide whether the witness was a target of the investi-
gation, i.e., a person the government was seeking to indict. Id. at 683. Second, the
court should examine the warnings law enforcement officials gave the witness. This test
does not require full Miranda warnings. Instead, the court can consider the impact of any
partial warnings or of the lack of any warning. Id. at 684. Third, the court should take
into account the witness' educational and criminal background. Id. Fourth, the court
should examine the availability of legal counsel to the witness. Id.
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Applying this voluntariness test, the Court should have found
that Murphy's lack of knowledge of his rights weighed in favor of a
self-executing privilege. Murphy's right to remain silent was un-
clear at the time of his interrogation. As discussed above, even the
Solicitor General misunderstood the rights available to Murphy.1 37
It is obvious that Murphy's rights were not well-established when he
met with his probation officer; the Court, therefore, cannot fairly
charge that Murphy knew his rights.
Murphy's inability to consult with counsel before or during the
interrogation also should have weighed in favor of a self-executing
privilege. Without access to counsel, the potential for unfairness in-
creases. The Court discounted the effect of this factor by holding
that Murphy should have expected questions about previous crimi-
nal conduct.138 His probation officer, however, led him to believe
that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss a new treatment pro-
gram.13 9 Even though he might have suspected that she had new
information about a prior crime, the probation officer stressed that
the purpose of the visit was to discuss the need for new treat-
ment. 140 Thus, it would be reasonable for Murphy to believe that he
would not be interrogated about prior crimes at this meeting. By
finding that the lack of opportunity to consult with counsel favors a
self-executing privilege, the Court would not unreasonably burden
noncustodial criminal interrogations. An attorney would not have
to be present at all noncustodial interrogations, but if an attorney
were present, a court could consider that fact when deciding
whether the confession was voluntary. Thus, the absence of counsel
would not automatically make the confession involuntary, but the
presence of counsel would weigh heavily toward finding that a sus-
pect's statements were not coerced.
Finally, the Court should have found that Murphy reasonably
could have perceived a threat of revocation of his probation that
impaired his free choice to exercise his right to remain silent.' 4 '
The terms of Murphy's probation stated in bold type that probation
was conditioned upon his being truthful with his probation officer in
all matters. 142 The majority held that this language required him to
137 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
138 Murphy, 104 S. Ct. at 1145.
139 Id. at 1140.
140 Id.
141 The Court found that Murphy could not have reasonally believed that his proba-
tion would be revoked for refusing to incriminate himself because "[o]ur decisions have
made clear that the State could not constitutionally carry out a threat to revoke proba-
tion for the legitimate exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege." 104 S. Ct. at 1148.
142 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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answer all matters truthfully, except that he was free to claim the
privilege for incriminating questions. 43 The probation letter, how-
ever, clearly stated on its face that he must respond truthfully in all
matters.144 It is highly unlikely that probationers, who have at most
only a vague familiarity with their fifth amendment privilege, would
understand that the State could not penalize them for invoking their
fifth amendment privilege. Because Murphy reasonably could have
perceived a threat for invoking the right to remain silent, the Court
should have found that his free will was overcome.
Although separately these factors may not have justified a deci-
sion that Murphy's confession was involuntary, all three factors to-
gether weighed against a finding of voluntariness and should have
led the Court to recognize a self-executing privilege. The self-exe-
cuting privilege prevents the State from benefitting from a coercive
interrogation by allowing the accused to invoke the privilege at trial
to suppress coerced statements. To allow admission of statements
that likely were involuntary allows states to coerce confessions and
unnecessarily undermines the fifth amendment rights of
probationers.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Minnesota v. Murphy, the Court correctly refused to find that
Murphy was in custody at the time of the interrogation and to apply
Miranda; however, it mechanically applied its witness analogy to
Murphy's situation. In doing so, the Court steered away from the
policies of earlier cases that prevented states from threatening a sus-
pect with any substantial penalty for the assertion of the fifth
amendment privilege. The Court thus has provided new opportuni-
ties for the states to obtain involuntary confessions by exploiting
suspects' lack of knowledge of their fifth amendment privilege.
LYNNETrE L. LUPIA
143 104 S. Ct. at 1148.
144 See supra note 66.
